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Abstract
The ecosystem services framework has enabled the broader public to acknowledge the
benefits nature provides to different stakeholders. However, not all stakeholders benefit
equally from these services. Rather, power relationships are a key factor influencing the
access of individuals or groups to ecosystem services. In this paper, we propose an adapta-
tion of the “cascade” framework for ecosystem services to integrate the analysis of ecologi-
cal interactions among ecosystem services and stakeholders’ interactions, reflecting power
relationships that mediate ecosystem services flows. We illustrate its application using the
floodplain of the River Piedra (Spain) as a case study. First, we used structural equation
modelling (SEM) to model the dependence relationships among ecosystem services. Sec-
ond, we performed semi-structured interviews to identify formal power relationships among
stakeholders. Third, we depicted ecosystem services according to stakeholders’ ability to
use, manage or impair ecosystem services in order to expose how power relationships
mediate access to ecosystem services. Our results revealed that the strongest power was
held by those stakeholders who managed (although did not use) those keystone ecosystem
properties and services that determine the provision of other services (i.e., intermediate reg-
ulating and final services). In contrast, non-empowered stakeholders were only able to
access the remaining non-excludable and non-rival ecosystem services (i.e., some of the
cultural services, freshwater supply, water quality, and biological control). In addition, land
stewardship, access rights, and governance appeared as critical factors determining the
status of ecosystem services. Finally, we stress the need to analyse the role of stakeholders
and their relationships to foster equal access to ecosystem services.
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Introduction
The ecosystem services framework [1] has enabled the broader public to acknowledge the ben-
efits nature provides to humans [2]. These include tangible or material benefits such as provi-
sioning services (e.g., food, raw materials) and intangible or immaterial benefits such as
cultural services (e.g., recreation, relaxation, environmental education, and aesthetic enjoy-
ment), regulating services (e.g., nutrient regulation and climate regulation), and supporting
ecosystem properties (i.e., the underlying mechanisms of the ecosystems) such as habitat provi-
sion and soil formation. However, not everybody benefits equally from these ecosystem ser-
vices. Recent research highlighted spatial characteristics as drivers of inequalities in ecosystem
services provision [3,4]. For example, whereas ‘upstream’ populations may benefit from water
quality, ‘downstream’ populations may not. Yet, the potential of ecosystems to benefit humans
not only depends on the spatial characteristics of the flow of services [5–8] but are derived
from their multiple types of interactions [9,10]. On the one hand, these depend on the interac-
tions among ecosystem properties and ecosystem services causing trade-offs and synergies
[11,12]. On the other hand, the interactions among stakeholders, which are partially caused by
power relationships, can determine the access to and management of ecosystem services.
Power relationships are a well-known concept used in natural resource management to
determine asymmetries in the access to resources [13–18]. Power relationships are also well-
known in social sciences and are used to uncover the inherent asymmetries in social relations
[19–23]. For instance, ecological anthropology and political ecology incorporate the concept of
power to human-environment interactions [24]. In ecosystem services literature, studies ana-
lysing power relationships are developed in the context of payments for ecosystem services
[25,26]. In this paper we investigate how power relationships modulate either the stakeholders’
use of ecosystem services or the interactions between the ecosystem services supplied. Power
asymmetries among stakeholders mean that some stakeholders may use a particular ecosystem
service or a set of ecosystem services while other stakeholders might be excluded. Therefore,
power asymmetries can create social conflict [4,27], and affect stakeholders’ well-being [28].
For instance, empowered stakeholders can decide about the ecosystem services supplied and
regulate access to them, negatively affecting non-empowered stakeholders by reducing their
ability to access ecosystem services. In addition, management decisions ultimately driven by
power relationships modulate ecosystem services interactions resulting in trade-offs between
ecosystem services [9,29]. Therefore, power relationships emerge as a key factor influencing: (i)
stakeholders’ access to ecosystem services; (ii) stakeholders’ interactions and roles regarding
ecosystem services; and (iii) environmental management shaping the provision of ecosystem
services.
Including the concept of power relationships into ecosystem services research exposes the
gap between the production of services by an ecosystem and the actual benefits stakeholders
receive. Such gaps can reveal those stakeholders dependent on certain ecosystem services for
their well-being that are at risk of being excluded from accessing ecosystem services [28].
Power relationships, including the beneficiaries of ecosystem services, the contributors to ser-
vices production, and those who are excluded (i.e., the losers [30]) have not yet been integrated
into ecosystem services management [31]. Integrating power relationships into ecosystem ser-
vices research explicitly provides an opportunity to assess how power mediates ecosystem ser-
vices flows that may be crucial information to design more sustainable management policies.
In this context, the aim of this study was to reveal the role of power relationships for ecosys-
tem services flows from the supply by the ecosystems to the users. In order to address this gen-
eral aim, in the next section we describe the adaptation of the ecosystem services ‘cascade’
framework to integrate the analysis of ecological interactions among ecosystem services and of
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power asymmetries among stakeholders that determine the use and management of ecosystem
services. Then we describe the methods used to apply the conceptual framework to the River
Piedra case study in northeastern Spain. The results section shows the main findings related to
the dependence relationships among the ecosystem services analysed and the role of stakehold-
ers mediating access to ecosystem services through the identification of power asymmetries. In
the discussion section we address the applicability of the conceptual framework and the impli-
cations for accessing ecosystem services of both power imbalances among stakeholders and the
excludable and rival characteristics of ecosystem services. Finally, we provide some insights for
environmental management to deal with social-ecological interactions along the flow of ecosys-
tem services.
Conceptual Framework
The ‘cascade’ framework depicts ecosystem services as a flow from the ecosystem towards
human well-being [32]. This framework has been gradually modified to incorporate ongoing
developments of ecosystem service science [33–35], such as the introduction of societal pro-
cesses in the step from ‘service’ to ‘benefit’ [36]. We propose to further refine this step by iden-
tifying both the interactions among ecosystem services and among stakeholders that mediate
and could impair stakeholders’ access to ecosystem services (Fig 1).
Ecosystem properties (i.e., the biophysical structure and functioning of ecosystems) contrib-
ute to provide ecosystem services and human well-being. However, ecosystem services are not
isolated independent units, but rather depend on each other [37] and interact causing trade-
offs and synergies [12] (see Table 1 for definitions). Some of these interactions can be deter-
mined by the use and management of ecosystem services performed by stakeholders [9,29,38].
Thus, the flow of ecosystem services is shaped through the social system (i.e., stakeholders’
interactions, roles, and preferences) by several types of complex interactions among multiple
stakeholders. First, stakeholders interact among themselves through different types of relation-
ships that are modulated by formal power asymmetries (e.g., property rights, access, or legal
permissions), informal power asymmetries (e.g., social leadership, gender inequity), or hidden
power imbalances (e.g., social pressure promoting self-censorship). Second, stakeholders play
different roles in the management and use of ecosystem services. We identify two main roles
Fig 1. Conceptual framework of the interactions along the flow of ecosystem services from the
supply-side to the demand-side and humanwell-being. Blue arrows represent the flow of ecosystem
services. Beige arrows denote interactions within or from the social system (Inspired from Haines-Young and
Potschin [32], Martín-López et al. [34], Spangenberg et al. [36]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.g001
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for stakeholders: they can manage ecosystem services (i.e., co-producing or impairing them),
or be recipients of ecosystem services (i.e., using them but also being excluded from access)
[31]. A single stakeholder could perform several of these roles [39]. In addition, stakeholders’
interactions affect the role of individual stakeholders in the system, which in turn perpetuates
their power relationships [40–44]. The social system drives environmental management, estab-
lishing the management and use of ecosystem services and conditioning the ecosystem proper-
ties responsible for ecosystem service provision [45,46].
Methods
Study area
The study area comprises the municipalities across the River Piedra (616 km2) in north-eastern
Spain (Fig 2). The region is characterized by marked seasonal variability in the water flow. The
upper part of the River Piedra (ca. 46 km) is dry for most of the year due to a combination of a
semiarid climate and a calcareous substrate. The middle part of the river is permanent (ca.
30 km), as it receives groundwater discharge. River flow rates in the lower lands are usually
altered with respect to natural rates depending on La Tranquera reservoir operations. This
78800000 m3 reservoir is regulated primarily for the benefit of irrigators from others basins.
The land cover of the floodplain is characterized by agricultural use (76%), including dry-
land cereal crops in the upper lands, irrigated cereal crops and poplar groves in the middle
part, and fruit groves and orchards in the lower lands. Riparian forests (4.2%) are restricted to
the upland gorges (usually dry) located between the municipalities of Aldehuela de Liestos and
Embid, and to a private natural park, the Monasterio de Piedra, located in the municipality of
Nuévalos. The park’s main attraction is the large number of waterfalls of the River Piedra,
which contrast hugely with the semiarid surrounding landscape. The tourism generated by the
park is the main economic driver of the area, and attracts tourists to other nearby amenities
and activities (e.g., restaurants, lodges, trekking, mountain-biking, ornithology, fishing, kayak-
ing). The population is dominated by elderly people and significantly more men than women,
although this trend reverses during school holidays.
Table 1. Key concepts related to ecosystem services and definitions. Concepts are listed according to
the order they appear in the text.
Concept Deﬁnition
Trade-off Situation in which land use or management actions increase the provision of one
ecosystem service and decrease the provision of another. This may be caused by
simultaneous responses to the same driver or caused by true interactions among
ecosystem services (adapted from [12]).
Synergy A win-win situation that involves a mutual improvement of two ecosystem services
(adapted from [38]).
Stakeholder Any group, organization or individual having a stake, interest, or who can affect a
biological or physical resource, ecosystem service, institution or social system, or
someone who is or may be affected by a public policy (adapted from [29,38]).
Power
relationships
The human ability to control or inﬂuence the access of others to ecosystem services.
Beneﬁciary Stakeholders who directly use and beneﬁt from ecosystem services [39].
Impairer Stakeholders who negatively affect the provision of ecosystem services as a
consequence of their direct or indirect use (adapted from [39]).
Manager Stakeholders who directly inﬂuences the way ecosystem services are provided or can
be used [39].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.t001
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Data collection
Ecosystem services supply. We identified the key ecosystem services provided by flood-
plains following Harrison et al. [47] at European scale, and Vidal-Abarca and Suárez [48] at
national scale, as well as from prior knowledge of the functioning and the ecosystem services of
the study area [29]. We gathered available data of 12 ecosystem services that were relevant to
maintain the flow of services in the area. The selection included two supporting ecosystem
properties (soil conditions, composed of soil formation and soil stability, and habitat quality),
four regulating services (nutrient regulation, carbon sequestration, biological control, and
water quality), three provisioning services (freshwater supply, food production, and raw mate-
rials), and three cultural services (aesthetic, recreation, and environmental education). Table 2
synthesizes the methods and indicators used for measuring each ecosystem service. For further
details about methods see S1 File.
Ecosystem services benefits. To learn about the ecosystem services used in the floodplain
of the River Piedra and the limitations to benefiting from these services, we conducted 71 face-
to-face, semi-structured interviews with the main stakeholders of the study area. These
included residents, holidaymakers, farmers, tour operators (hosting or guiding nature tourists),
Fig 2. The watershed of the River Piedra in NE Spain divided bymunicipality boundaries. Dots indicate
ecological sample points and stars social sample points (note that external stakeholders are not represented
in this figure).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.g002
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local mayors, local teachers, scientists, nature protection agents, and technicians working on
riverbank restoration projects. The targeted local population comprised 880 inhabitants [63]
from five municipalities (see Fig 2). The municipalities within the seasonal river flow were
excluded from this study as they do not perceive themselves to live within a riparian ecosystem
and their activities depend little on this ecosystem.
Table 3 presents a classification of stakeholders and a brief description. Interviewees were
asked about the status of the riparian ecosystem, the causes and solutions to solve the problems
Table 2. Description of the supporting ecosystem properties and ecosystem services identified as relevant to maintain the flow of services in the
River Piedra floodplain.






Supporting Intermediate Habitat quality RQI Riparian Quality Index (unitless) 21 2011, 2012 [49]
Supporting Intermediate Soil conditions Soil formation Organic matter content in top
soil (percentage)
324 2011, 2012 [50]
Soil stability Organic matter layer in top soil
(cm)
324 2011, 2012 [51]
Regulating Intermediate Water quality NO2
- Nitrite content in water (ppm) 281 2009–2011 [52]
NO3
- Nitrate content in water (ppm) 281 2009–2011 [52]
PO4
- Phosphate content in water
(ppm)
281 2009–2011 [52]
Regulating Intermediate Nutrient regulation C Total carbon in top soil
(percentage)
324 2011, 2012 [53]
N Total nitrogen in top soil
(percentage)
324 2011, 2012 [29]
P Total phosphorus in top soil
(percentage)
324 2011, 2012 [54]
Regulating Intermediate Biological control Vertical vegetation
structure





CO2 sequestration CO2 equivalent tons
sequestered by plants (CO2 eq
tons/year)
21 2011 [56]
Provisioning Final Freshwater supply Water
consumption




Provisioning Final Food production Yield Kilograms per hectare (kg/Ha 
year)
21 2011 [58]
Calories Kilocalories per hectare (kcal/
Ha  year)
21 2011 [58]
Gross value Euros per hectare (€/Ha  year) 21 2011 [59]
Provisioning Final Raw materials Production Tons of annual biomass
increase (tons/year)
21 2011 [56]
Cultural Final Aesthetic Pictures Number of pictures uploaded to
Panoramio (number)
84 2014 [60]
Cultural Final Recreation Fishing Meters of river available for
ﬁshing (m)
84 2012 [61]
Sports Extent of ﬂoodplain viewshed
from open access trails (Ha)
84 2012 [62]
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identified, and about the uses, products, and benefits they derived from the valley of the River
Piedra. A minimum number of ten stakeholders from each of the main stakeholders’ groups
were interviewed until the information received was saturated (i.e., we did not receive any new
information from the same sector of stakeholders [64]). Interviews were performed by the first
author between August 2011 and March 2012 and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Digital
records of the interviews were made with the interviewees’ consent. Interviews were tran-
scribed and coded for further analysis (see Table A in S2 File for details of the interviewees).
Data analysis
Ecosystem services supply. To model the flow of ecosystem services, we built an initial
path model (Fig 3) on the basis of the classification of ecosystem services as intermediate or
final. To build the path model, we convened an expert panel in May 2014 composed of four
experts from the fields of ecosystem service science, conservation ecology, and limnology. The
experts independently modelled the flow of ecosystem services in the study area. To assess the
performance of the model we used structural equation modelling (SEM), a statistical technique
to model complex multivariable relationships. SEM includes two models: the relations among
all latent variables (i.e. the ecosystem services), and the relations between the manifest
(observed) variables and their own latent variable (i.e. between the indicators used (Table 2)
and the ecosystem services estimated) [65].
In our model, supporting ecosystem properties were considered as exogenous latent vari-
ables (i.e., independent on other ecosystem services), and intermediate regulating services and
final services as endogenous latent variables (i.e., dependent on other ecosystem services) (Fig
3). Thus, in the River Piedra case study, soil conditions and habitat quality were the supporting
ecosystem properties from which ecosystem services depended directly (linked by an arrow) or
indirectly (linked through an intermediate regulating service). Nutrient regulation is a regulat-
ing service which directly depended on soil conditions and habitat quality. Carbon sequestra-
tion depended on habitat quality (because the quantity of trees mediates carbon sequestration)
and nutrient regulation (also mediates trees’ performance). Biological control depended on
habitat quality as the number of vertical vegetation structures hosting species performing dif-
ferent functions in the ecosystem depends on it. Water quality was related to habitat quality
Table 3. Stakeholders’ groups, number of respondents, and description.
Group Name n Description
1 Primary sector 16 Farmers (including both land owners and land tenants of orchards, fruit
groves, irrigated and dry cereal crops, and poplar groves), shepherds, and
workers at a ﬁsh farm.
2 Recreation
sector
13 Owners or workers at restaurants, hotels, lodges, nature tour operators,
adventure enterprises, and at the Monasterio de Piedra (i.e., a regional
touristic site).
3 Leisure 26 Retired residents, visitors, hikers, bikers, ﬁshermen, etc.
4 Institutions 16 Local councils.
Government bodies: the regional water management body (Confederación
Hidrográﬁca del Ebro), which depends on the Ministry of the Environment;
Nature Protection Agents, which depend on the regional government
(Gobierno de Aragón).
Scientiﬁc and educational institutions: scientists from the Pyrenean
Institute of Ecology (IPE – CSIC) and the University of Zaragoza; teachers
from the local elementary school and high school.
Technicians from a public company working on environmental projects on
the riverbanks and the ﬂoodplain of the River Piedra.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.t003
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(e.g., a good quality of riparian habitats avoids runoffs into water) and to nutrient regulation
(e.g., through regulating nitrogen and phosphorus content in soils). Freshwater supply was
connected to both habitat and water quality as water supplied needs to be in a good ecological
and chemical status which is mediated by a good habitat quality. Food and raw materials pro-
duction was related to freshwater supply (e.g., increasing water for irrigation increases produc-
tivity) and to regulating services (nutrient regulation and biological control), whereas cultural
services were directly linked to habitat quality.
We followed a formative SEM approach [66], in which each latent variable is related to its
manifest variable by a linear function plus a residual term. We normalized all manifest vari-
ables to ensure homogeneous weights and checked the unidimensionality of the blocks of man-
ifest variables using two criteria: i) Cronbach’s alpha greater or equal to 0.7 [67] and ii) Dillon-
Goldstein’s rho greater or equal to 0.7 [68]. Manifest variables not meeting these criteria were
dropped from the initial model. The quality of the final model was assessed using: i) the Rela-
tive Goodness of Fit index [69]; ii) the adjusted R2 of the latent variables; and iii) the average
communalities [70]. All statistical analyses were performed with the software XLSTAT
(2014.3.01).
Ecosystem services benefits. The ecosystem services mentioned by each stakeholder
group during the interviews (see Table B in S2 File) provided evidence of their role in relation
to ecosystem services. According to this information, we linked each stakeholder group to the
services they used, contributed to produce, or impaired. Additionally, we classified the
Fig 3. Conceptual diagram of the initial structural equationmodel (SEM) based on those paths among variables determined by the expert panel.
Latent variables (i.e., ecosystem properties or services) are denoted by ellipses, while manifest variables (i.e., the indicators used) are inside a box.
Supporting ecosystem properties (i.e., exogenous latent variables) are shaded, intermediate regulating services are dashed, and final services are solid.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.g003
ES Flows and Power Relationships
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ecosystem services identified within a gradient from rival to non-rival, and from excludable to
non-excludable through an expert panel. The panel was held in June 2014 and comprised six
experts from the fields of ecosystem services, policy, and land management. Each of the experts
independently classified ecosystem services according to the characteristics of this case study.
In cases of divergence, the moderator of the panel unified the classifications according to the
comments provided by each expert. We followed the approach of Costanza [71] (p. 351) which
defined rival ecosystem services as those that can be consumed (“the degree that one person’s
benefiting from them interferes with or is rival with other’s benefiting from them”), and exclud-
able ecosystem services as those that can be privatized (“the degree that individuals can be
excluded from benefiting from them”), and we incorporated the concept of congestible (i.e.,
moving from non-rival to rival if excessive use decreases their good initial conditions) sug-
gested by Fisher et al. [3]. We used this classification to represent each ecosystem service in a
diagram showing stakeholders’ use versus ability to manage ecosystem services by adapting the
approach proposed by Reed et al. [17] and Iniesta-Arandia et al. [72], where the former identi-
fied four clusters according to the degree of power and interest of stakeholders and the latter
according to their degree of dependence and influence. Additionally, we included a variant of
this diagram displaying stakeholders’ use versus their ability to impair ecosystem services.
Ethics statement. Part of these analyses is based on interviews results. The interviewees
were voluntary, and their answers were confidential and anonymized for analysis. Participants
verbally consented to participate in this study under these conditions. Written consent was not
requested in order to facilitate the interactions between interviewer and participants. We can-
not document participant consent because we only started recording once participants had
given their agreement. When participants did not agree to be recorded but consented to partic-
ipate, written notes were taken by the interviewer. The Academic Commission of the Doctorate
Program in Environment and Society of the Universidad Pablo de Olavide (Seville, Spain)
approved this study and this consent procedure. Additionally, the Instituto Pirenaico de
Ecología – CSIC, approved the methods used in field sampling.
Results
Dependence relationships among ecosystem services on the supply
side
The SEMmodel explained a large proportion of the variation in the flow of ecosystem services,
with a Relative Goodness of Fit of 0.858 (Table 4). A greater part of the variance was explained
for environmental education (R2a = 0.817), recreation (R
2
a = 0.784), and nutrient regulation
(R2a = 0.488). Less variance (R
2
a< 0.45) was explained for carbon sequestration, biological
control, and raw materials.
The results of the SEM highlighted the fact that some ecosystem services were strongly
related to others, while others were less influenced (Fig 4). Ecosystem properties (i.e., soil con-
ditions and habitat quality) were key variables, given the significant influence they had on all
ecosystem services to which they were related, except to freshwater supply. Soil conditions had
a significant strong influence on nutrient regulation (β = 0.758). The largest influence of habitat
quality was on environmental education (β = 0.904), recreation (β = 0.842), biological control
(β = 0.615), and carbon sequestration (β = 0.524). Habitat quality also had significant but weak
(β 0.1) influence on water quality and aesthetics, and a weak significant negative influence
on nutrient regulation (β = -0.135). This latter could be explained by the different types of land
uses included in the assessment, for which there might be opposite relationships. For instance,
perennial forests have excellent quality (as assessed using the Riparian Quality Index [48]) but
do not contribute much to nutrient regulation; conversely, cultivated land uses might have
ES Flows and Power Relationships
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high concentrations of nutrients due to human inputs through fertilization. Intermediate ser-
vices also had significant but weaker influence on final ecosystem services: biological control
had a positive influence on raw materials (β = 0.379) and nutrient regulation had a negative
influence on food production (β = -0.180), which can be explained by the fact that increasing
food production can reduce nutrient regulation. Final services also displayed some interactions,
namely, aesthetics had a weak significant positive influence on recreation (β = 0.153).
The contribution of each service is represented by arrow thickness in Fig 4 and highlights
the main interactions maintaining the flow of ecosystem services. In our case study, supporting
ecosystem properties (soil conditions and habitat quality) strongly influenced intermediate reg-
ulating services and cultural services, indicating that these are the key variables that mediate
the flow of ecosystem services.
Restrictions on the use of ecosystem services
Four stakeholders groups were identified (see Table 3): primary sector, recreation sector, leisure
and formal institutions. The identification of the ecosystem services linked to each stakeholder
group was useful to detect key ecosystem services for each stakeholder group in terms of their
use, the ability of stakeholders to manage each service, and power asymmetries derived from
the management of ecosystem services (Fig 5). The primary sector (Group 1) was linked to
most ecosystem services, either by using, co-producing, or impairing them; in addition, they
were the main managers of two provisioning services (raw materials and food production).
The recreation sector (Group 2) used and impaired water-related services, and used and co-pro-
duced carbon sequestration and cultural services, part of which they had great ability to man-
age. Leisure (Group 3) was linked to cultural and water-related services and to biological
control. These three groups were also indirectly linked to habitat quality. The ecosystem ser-
vices linked to formal institutions (Group 4) were used indirectly, except environmental educa-
tion, which was co-produced by a section of this group (i.e., the government bodies and
scientists), and used by the other section (i.e., the schools and universities). Further, this group
was the main manager of habitat quality, water quality, and freshwater supply.
These results together with a general overview of the power relationships among stakehold-
ers enabled us to classify the ecosystem services of this case study within a rival/non-rival and
excludable/non-excludable matrix (Table 5, see S3 File for details).
Table 4. Latent variables, adjusted R2 (R2 a), average communality (Ave. Com.), and Dillon-Goldstein’s
(D.G.) Rho from the structural equationmodelling (SEM).
Latent variable R2 a Ave. Com. D.G. Rho
Habitat quality 1.000 1.000
Soil conditions 0.558 0.747
Nutrient regulation 0.488 0.316 0.679
Biological control 0.378 1.000 1.000
Water quality 0.065 0.592 0.823
Freshwater supply 0.003 1.000 1.000
Food production 0.028 0.606 0.858
Raw materials 0.136 1.000 1.000
Aesthetic 0.043 1.000 1.000
Recreation 0.784 0.639 0.799
Environmental education 0.817 1.000 1.000
Carbon sequestration 0.259 1.000 1.000
Relative Goodness of Fit (0.858)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.t004
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How stakeholders mediate access to ecosystem services
We related stakeholders’ roles to the rival/excludable classification of ecosystem services by
depicting each service in a diagram showing stakeholders’ use versus their ability to manage
ecosystem services (Fig 6A) and stakeholders’ use versus their ability to impair ecosystem ser-
vices (Fig 6B). The results on Fig 6A highlighted the effect of power relationships on access to
ecosystem services and differentiated five types of clusters, which mostly corresponded to the
previous stakeholder classification. Fig 6B provided complementary information especially
useful to identify situations in which the same stakeholder group used and impaired the same
ecosystem service.
We identified that formal institutions (Group 4) were the stakeholders with highest ability
to manage and lowest use of ecosystem services (Fig 6A, top left corner). They managed a key
supporting ecosystem property (habitat quality) and key intermediate regulating services
(water quality) able to maintain the ecosystem services flow and, thereby, affect other stake-
holders. Further, they managed final services, such as freshwater supply and recreation, with-
out using them.
The recreation sector (Group 2) had the highest ability to manage and to use ecosystem ser-
vices. This group contributed to produce cultural services by offering aesthetic enjoyment,
Fig 4. Structural equationmodel (SEM) results, showing the relationships between ecosystem services. Colours indicate the type of ecosystem
service (green = regulating, gold = provisioning, purple = cultural) and supporting ecosystem properties (blue). Intermediate regulating services are dashed
and final services are solid. Arrow thickness represents the percentage of the contribution to each service, where solid arrows represent positive relations
and dashed arrows negative relations. Numbers near arrows indicate the standardized regression coefficient and the asterisks denote significance
(* p 0.05; ** p 0.01; *** p 0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.g004
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recreation, and environmental education, exclusively managed some of these services, and also
used them, benefiting from the tourism generated (Fig 6A, top right corner).
The leisure (Group 3) and primary sector (Group 1) were the stakeholders with the lowest or
no ability to manage ecosystem services (Fig 6A, bottom right). Consequently, these stakehold-
ers benefited from just the remaining non-excludable and non-rival ecosystem services (a part
of cultural services, freshwater supply, water quality, and biological control).
Farmers from the primary sector (Group 1) were an intermediate cluster, as they had some
opportunities to manage the services they used the most (nutrient regulation, soil conditions,
and freshwater supply) through their farming practices (Fig 6A, right dotted line). However,
this group impaired these same ecosystem services by overuse, driving non-rival ecosystem ser-
vices to rival (Fig 6B, dotted line). Still in the second diagram, we observed that in the case of
biological control, the use of the service did not directly imply degradation; rather this service
was impaired by the farming practices used, which in turn may potentially affect other stake-
holders. The impairers of habitat quality were leisure activities and the primary sector; however,
they might not perceive it, as this service is not directly used but indirectly used through other
services dependent on it. In addition, farmers were the unique producers of food and raw
Fig 5. Ecosystem services related to each stakeholder group. Solid arrows represent positive relations between ecosystem services and dashed arrows
negative relations. Colours indicate the type of ecosystem services (green = regulating, gold = provisioning, purple = cultural) and supporting ecosystem
properties (blue). Intermediate regulating services are dashed and final services are solid. Impaired ecosystem services are in red, ecosystem services
managed or co-produced are in bold, and they are marked with an asterisk (*) when managed by a single group. Note that habitat quality and carbon
sequestration were only indirectly used by groups 1, 2 and 3, and that all ecosystem services linked to group 4 (excluding environmental education) were
used indirectly.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.g005
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materials (Fig 6A, left dotted line). However, as these provisioning services are mostly exported
outside the area, farmers just use them marginally (i.e., most of the production of such services









Congestible l Soil conditions* Water quality
Nutrient regulation* Soil conditions*








* Ecosystem services that can fall into several classiﬁcations according to speciﬁc situations. See main text for examples. Adapted from Fisher et al. [3]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.t005
Fig 6. a) Stakeholders’ use versus ability to manage ecosystem services (ES), and b) Stakeholders’ use versus ability to impair ecosystem
services (ES). The colour of the box indicates the type of ecosystem service (green = regulating, gold = provisioning, purple = cultural) and supporting
ecosystem properties (blue). Rival and excludable services are in rectangles, non-rival and non-excludable services are in ellipses, and congestible services
(non-excludable that can move from non-rival to rival) are in parallelograms. Bold boxes mark ecosystem services managed by a unique stakeholder group,
and dashed boxes indicate ecosystem services used and impaired by the same single-stakeholder group. Numbers in parentheses indicate the stakeholder
group (1 = Primary sector; 2 = Recreation sector; 3 = Leisure; 4 = Formal institutions; G = Global extent). The main clusters identified are marked in solid red
boxes, and the secondary clusters in dotted red boxes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132232.g006
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is not on a self-consumption basis; rather, the income of these stakeholders mostly comes from
the export of these goods).
Lastly, we identified a cluster that comprised those stakeholders having low use of ecosystem
services and low ability to manage them. These were external to the ecosystem (e.g., the global
food and raw materials markets and the carbon sequestration capacity of the atmosphere)
(Fig 6A, bottom left).
Key stakeholders control keystone ecosystem services: power matters
The identification of keystone ecosystem services to maintain the flow of services (Fig 4),
together with the identification of the stakeholder groups that used and managed them (Fig 6)
highlighted the critical effect of power asymmetries on access to ecosystem services. In our case
study, the strongest power was held by the formal institutions group through the management
of keystone supporting ecosystem properties and intermediate regulating services, on which
many other services depend or that are used by most stakeholder groups. For instance, habitat
quality had the strongest effects on the majority of ecosystem services: environmental educa-
tion, recreation, and nutrient regulation (Fig 4). Additionally, water-related services (water
quality and freshwater supply) were the most conflicting services as they aggregated the largest
number of beneficiaries and impairers (Fig 6B). As a consequence, the institutions group had
the power to promote synergies and trade-offs between ecosystem services and the power to
limit the use of those services they managed to specific stakeholders (e.g., regulations on fresh-
water supply and fishing permits), excluding others, and thus, creating potential social
imbalances.
Additionally, the recreation sector had strong power as they managed and used the cultural
ecosystem services driving the economy of the area. Finally, the primary sector had intermedi-
ate but still important influence on some ecosystem services. For instance, they were able to
moderately manage the provisioning services on which their main income is based (i.e., food
production and raw materials). Interestingly, the SEM revealed that, in our case study, these
services were fairly disconnected from other intermediate services (Table 4 and Fig 4) because
they were mainly dependent on human inputs (e.g., irrigation and fertilizers) rather than on
ecosystem functioning. Additionally, some farming practices impaired critical ecosystem ser-
vices (e.g., habitat quality, soil conditions, and nutrient regulation) that determined the integ-
rity of intermediate and final services, thereby creating powerful feedback to the stakeholders
using those intermediate and final services.
Discussion
Potential and limitations of the analysis of social-ecological interactions
along the ecosystem services flow
Integrating both ecological and social interactions along the flow of ecosystem services is key to
understanding the likely asymmetries between stakeholders fostered by environmental man-
agement and to promoting sustainable management of ecosystem services [73]. Recent
research has increasingly been addressing the flow of ecosystem services from production (sup-
ply-side) to use by society (demand-side) (e.g., [5,36,74,75]), and some have considered the
implications of access to ecosystem services [76]. However, no framework has yet made explicit
the existence of power relationships mediating both ecosystem services flows and stakeholder
interactions. Specifically, recent research has pointed out the need to analyse the role of multi-
ple stakeholder groups and their relationships with the provision, demand, and management
of ecosystem services in order to contribute insights for sustainable management of ecosystem
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services [73]. In previous research, structural equation models have been used to test relation-
ships between ecosystem properties and their effects on the provision of ecosystem services
[77], and between ecosystem services and their effects on human well-being [78]. However,
such analyses have not been previously connected to power relationships among stakeholders.
Moreover, although Fisher et al. [79] discussed the importance of power related to poverty alle-
viation and ecosystem services, power relationships have still rarely been considered explicitly
as a key factor determining asymmetries in the access to ecosystem services. Our study clearly
demonstrates the relevance of power relationships in determining access to ecosystem services
and its impact on the ecosystem services flow. Identifying and targeting such power relation-
ships is essential for delineating environmental management policies while reducing trade-offs
among ecosystem services [40] and thus, reducing social inequalities and conflicts.
The proposed framework was tested using our knowledge and data on the River Piedra case
study and demonstrated its validity for uncovering three critical dimensions of ecosystem ser-
vice actual supply: first, the dependence relationships among ecosystem services, and thus, the
implications of their use and management; second, the formal power asymmetries between
stakeholders; and third, the influence of such power relationships in the ability of stakeholders
to access and to manage ecosystem services.
In addition, our work has been useful to test a methodology that identifies which stakehold-
ers have the strongest power to mediate the flow of ecosystem services. These stakeholders
were: (i) those controlling key ecosystem services (because they either can directly affect to
other stakeholders, or can affect the capacity of the ecosystem to provide services); (ii) unique
managers of a particular ecosystem service, and thus, able to control access and use of such
service.
However, the application of such analyses in environmental management requires further
work to specify and address informal and hidden power relationships between and within the
stakeholder groups (e.g., social leadership, family ties, etc.). Other limitations for applying this
study elsewhere are that it was time-consuming, as it required biological and social sampling;
difficulties connecting biological sampling with social sampling to give insights into power
relationships; and difficulties including the adjacent municipalities within the geographic
boundaries (e.g., the river basin) but outside the targeted ecosystem (e.g. the river floodplain)
in the power relationships analyses.
The excludable and rival characteristics of ecosystem services
The classification of ecosystem services based on the concepts of excludability and rivalness
(Table 5) concurred with most theoretical examples from Costanza [71] and Fisher et al. [3].
However, in our case study, we did not identify any examples of excludable but non-rival ser-
vices, or non-excludable but rival, probably because management usually makes ecosystem ser-
vices congestible (i.e., driving services from non-rival to rival). For instance, ecosystem services
managed by the formal institutions group tended to fall into this category as this group can reg-
ulate the status of such services (e.g., policies to regulate water quality and waste water). More-
over, cultural services had two possible and opposite statuses: rival and excludable for activities
performed on private sites or mediated by private companies (i.e., by the recreation sector), and
non-rival and non-excludable, for those services enjoyed at open access sites. Hence, non-
empowered stakeholders (i.e., the leisure group and the bulk of the primary sector) only had
access to the remaining non-excludable and non-rival ecosystem services, and thus, are the
most vulnerable stakeholders [72] at risk of being excluded from accessing the ecosystem ser-
vices they need for their well-being.
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These results contrast to other applications of this framework [80], indicating that the status
of ecosystem services is highly context-dependent. In addition, classifying ecosystem services
along the rival and excludable gradient enables accounting for the multiple possible statuses of
an ecosystem service across land-use types and property rights. Indeed, the use of the land and
access rights appeared as the critical factors determining the status of ecosystem services. Pro-
viding open access to lands and avoiding preventable dis-services (e.g., through conservation
farming [81]) might change this classification. More importantly, focusing on managing the
non-rival to rival movements of ecosystem services (i.e., the congestible services) would pre-
vent their depletion.
Against monopolization of ecosystem services: insights for
environmental management
As the proposed framework pinpoints, environmental management mediates the use of ecosys-
tem services, and thus, their interactions [82]. Additionally, our results enabled us to distin-
guish how the management of each ecosystem service and power relationships among
stakeholders may condition its status across the rival/excludable matrix. For instance, single-
stakeholder management systems in which ecosystem services are used and managed by a sin-
gle stakeholder group generated positive feedback. Such positive feedback had two opposite
effects: they either reinforced the service, for example, recreational activities managed by the
recreation sector attracted more recreational activities; or depleted the service, such as for
instance, soil conditions and nutrient regulation managed by the primary sector were con-
sumed at faster rates than normal recovery; or the overuse of water by leisure activities
impaired their initially good status. Although single-stakeholder management systems should
ideally lead to negative feedback or internal self-regulation, there is a high risk of eliciting posi-
tive feedback, in which the service is depleted by unregulated use, decreasing the capacity of
the system to supply services in the long term.
In addition, we identified top-down management strategies, where management is made
from the higher levels of governance – usually involving stakeholders external to the social-eco-
logical system – to the local population. This was the case for the formal institutions group that
managed habitat quality and recreation, and the recreation sector that managed cultural ser-
vices. These management systems did not foster potential synergies among the ecosystem ser-
vices supplied by the River Piedra floodplain, such as enhancing habitat quality and cultural
services [29], and neither strengthened the communities’ governance of their resources. Rather,
the population in this area is mostly dependent on external capital such as the European Com-
mon Agricultural Policy subsidies for farmers or the investments made by the main companies
in the recreation sector. Top-down management systems often have low resilience [83,84] and
can fail to resolve resource-users’ conflicts [13] or rather contribute to create new environmen-
tal conflicts [85]. However, examples of participatory bottom-up management systems such as
decentralized forest management in Tanzania [86], coastal ecosystems in Kenya [87], and estu-
aries in South Africa [88] have proved to be important to complement existing top-down sys-
tems. In our case study and similar rural areas, such participatory systems could be
implemented by local governments and mediated by bridging institutions at different organiza-
tional levels, and should be adapted to the cultural and geographical characteristics of each
social-ecological system. In fact, bridging organizational levels through nesting institutions is
one of the basic principles that have been identified for creating robust bottom-up manage-
ment systems, together with deliberation and participation of interested stakeholders, institu-
tional diversity (i.e. formal and informal institutions) [89] and knowledge leadership [90].
Consequently, encouraging knowledge exchange through participatory mechanisms is
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important to guarantee that multiple stakeholders regularly interact and discuss about their
interests, needs and management of particular ecosystem services [91].
Conclusions
This paper shows that ecosystem services do not equally benefit the diversity of potential users,
highlighting the importance of power relationships in ecosystem services’ interactions and
their influence on the flow of ecosystem services. The dependency relationships between eco-
system services stressed the importance of the use and management of keystone ecosystem ser-
vices, i.e., those services that are essential for the provision of either intermediate or final
ecosystem services. We identified the formal power relationships exerted by stakeholders
according to their ability to access and to manage ecosystem services, and the mechanisms they
use to exert power. Therefore, those stakeholders able to manage such keystone ecological
properties and ecosystem services can affect the well-being of other stakeholder groups by
determining the ecosystem’s capacity to provide services and/or by controlling access to them.
Consequently, in order to delineate sustainable management practices that foster equal
access to ecosystem services, it is necessary to contribute detailed information on: (i) ecosystem
services’ interactions, (ii) the governance for each ecosystem service, (iii) the role of stakehold-
ers regarding each ecosystem service, and (iv) the power relationships established among stake-
holders. The present study presents a conceptual framework able to empirically operationalize
the integration of such information.
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